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Bases of Slander Per Se in Ohio
The action of slander was first considered to be cognizable
only in the ecclesiastical courts of England because it was a spiritual
matter. Later when the common law courts of England began to
take jurisdiction over the action of slander the emphasis was
placed on temporal damages to the defamed individual because the
common law courts did not want to invade ecclesiastical law.'
Therefore the general rule developed that slander would not be
actionable without proof of special damages. This general rule did
not stand very long before certain exceptions were read into it.
Since the exceptions did not require proof of special damages the
distinction between slander per se and slander per quod arose.
The early imputations which formed the exceptions are impu-
tations of a crime, contagious disease, or unfitness for trade, pro-
fession, office, or calling. The fact that these imputations became
exceptions to the rule are based on the idea that from an imputa-
tion of this kind actual damage can be presumed.2 Imputation of
a crime as being actionable per se was probably the first exception
to be recognized in that it dated back to the days when the courts
were trying to determine which words would be actionable in the
common law courts and which words would be actionable in the ec-
clesiastical courts. The other two categories seem to have developed
later and are probably based on the obvious tendency for such an
imputation to cause damage or temporal loss.3
In the United States these specific categories have been gen-
erally accepted. The Supreme Court in Pollard v. Lyon,4 after re-
viewing the cases, laid down five classes which would give a cause
of action for oral slander. They are:
(1) Words falsely spoken of a person which impute to
the party the commission of some criminal offense involv-
ing moral turpitude, for which the party, if the charge is
true, may be indicted and punished. (2) Words falsely
spoken of a person which impute that the party is infected
with some contagious disease, when, if the charge is true,
it would exclude the party from society; or (3) Defamatory
words falsely spoken of a person, which impute to the party
unfitness to perform the duties of an office or employment
of profit, or the want of integrity in the discharge of the
duties of such an office or employment. (4) Defamatory
words falsely spoken of a party which prejudice such party
in his or her profession or trade. (5) Defamatory words
iPliossm, ToaTs §92 (1941).
2 Holdsworth, Defamation in the 16th and 17th Centurjes, 40 L. Q. Rrv.
397, 398 (1924).
3 Id. at 398-400.
4 91 U.S. 225, 226 (1875).
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falsely spoken of a person, which, though not in themselves
actionable, occasion the party special damage.
It is immediately noticed that all of the classes, with the ex-
ception of the last, are actionable per se.
During the same year the Supreme Court of Ohio also laid
down a similar set of rules.5 To these exceptions, Ohio has also
added an imputation of unchastity to a girl or woman.0 This com-
ment will treat each of these exceptions individually with special
reference to Ohio law.
ImPUTATION OF CRIME
For many years in America and in England the law was un-
certain as to what words were actionable per se. This uncertainty
caused the courts to attempt a formula that would be not only
simple and comprehensive but also easy in practical application.
Out of these attempts emerged a formula that has become accepted
as the American rule. The rule was laid down in the case of
Brooker v. Coffin 7 and it read as follows:
In case the charge, if true, will subject the party charged
to an indictment for a crime involving moral turpitude, or
subject him to an infamous punishment then the words
will be in themselves actionable.
Even though one Ohio case broadly and unqualifiedly states that
an oral imputation of a crime is actionable per se,s the American
rule can be considered as the settled law in Ohio.9 It is seen from
looking at the rule that it is not always prima facie actionable to
impute to a person an act which is subject to indictment and punish-
ment. Rather, importance is attached to the inherent nature of the
indictable act and to the punishment which the law assigns to it.10
The reason for making some distinction as to the nature of the crime
was considered necessary because of the extension of criminal
punishment to many minor offenses, the violation of which would
not exclude the person from society.
The first of the two necessary elements of the rule as formu-
lated in Brooker v. Coffin, and accepted in Ohio, is that an indict-
able crime must be charged before the words are actionable per
se.1' An "indictable offense," as defined in Ohio, is any offense that
is punishable in our temporal courts having criminal jurisdiction,
Slnfra, p. 322.
6 Barnett v. Ward, 36 Ohio St. 107 (1880); OnRo REv. CoDE §290L37 (13383).
75 Johns. (N.Y.) 188 (1809).
8 Fox v. Eagle, Dayton 135 (1868).
9 Davis v. Brown, 27 Ohio St. 326 (1875); Hollingsworth v. Shaw, 19 Ohio
St. 430 (1869); Allele v. Wright, 17 Ohio St. 238 (1867); Dial v. Holter, 6
Ohio St. 228 (1856); Hughey v. Bradrick, 39 Ohio App. 486, 177 N.E. 911
(1931); Landis v. Caylor, 5 Ohio Nisi Prius 216 (1898).
Io CooLmr, ToRTs §139 (4th ed. 1932).
11 Supra, n. 9.
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either by indictment or information.j Thus it is not slander per se
to charge a partner with entering and carrying away partnership
property because he cannot burglarize partnership property.13 Like-
wise an imputation of a crime that is cognizable only in a military
court is not actionable without averment of special damages be-
cause it does not charge an indictable crime. 14 Years ago an Ohio
court held that words imputing a charge that involved moral turpi-
tude, which at common law would have subjected the guilty person
to infamous punishment, were actionable per se even though the
charge was not a statutory crime in Ohio.15 In spite of this general
statement, the Ohio courts have not enlarged the American rule
and still hold that the words must impute a crime that is an in-
dictable offense involving moral turpitude or must subject the
offender to infamous punishment.16 Since the original reason for
making the imputation of a crime an exception to the common
law rule was that such imputation would place the person charged
in danger of criminal prosecution, 17 it therefore follows that an
imputation of mere criminal intent would not be actionable per se
because criminal intent in and of itself is not a criminal offense.1 8
Later when the emphasis shifted from danger of criminal prosecu-
tion to social ostracism, 19 accusations of criminal conduct for which
the punishment had been inflicted, 20 or for which there had been
a pardon,2 - or for which prosecution had been barred by the stat-
ute of limitations22 would support an action for slander without al-
leging special damages. This conclusion is arrived at because even
though the person charged with the criminal act is immune from
any punishment for such act, still his reputation may be damaged
12 Zehring v. Zehring, 1 Dayton Term. Rep. (Iddings) 25 (1899).
1 3 Alfele v. Wright, 17 Ohio St. 238 (1867).
14Hollingsworth v. Shaw, 19 Ohio St. 430 (1869).
IS Alfele v. Wright, 17 Ohio St. 238 (1867).
16 Davis v. Brown, 27 Ohio St. 326 (1875); Hamm v. Wickline, 26 Ohio St.
81 (1875); Hollingsworth v. Shaw, 19 Ohio St. 430 (1869); Hughey v. Brad-
rick, 39 Ohio App. 486, 117 N.E. 911 (1931); Phillips v. LeJune, 1 Ohio Cr. Ct.
(N.S.) 616 (1903).
i7Paossas, TORTS §92 (1941).
1 8 Bollenbacher v. Society for Savings, 148 Ohio St. 649, 76 N.. 2d 866
(1947); Seaton v. Corday, Wright 101 (1832); 33 Am. Jmu. Ii AmN Srn
§13 (1948); RsTAT EmEN oF ToRTs §571 Comment c (1938).
19 In Alfele v. Wright, 17 Ohio St. 238, 241 (1867) the court states that it is
not jeopardy of punishment, but injury to the reputation which constitutes
the ground of action for slander.2o Michael v. Matheis, 77 Mo. App. 556 (1898).
Z Shipp v. McCraw, 7 N.C. 463 (1819).
22 Webb v. Fitch, 1 Root (Conn.) 544 (1793); Brightman v. Davies; 3
N.J. Misc. 113, 127 Atl. 327 (1925); Van Ankin v. Westfall, 14 Johns. (N.Y.)
233 (1817).
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in the eyes of the public. Since the requirement of the rule is that
an indictable crime must be charged, if words that would other-
wise impute an indictable crime are understood by all who hear
them that they are not intended to charge a crime, they are not
actionable per se;2 3 but if the statement would naturally and pre-
sumably be understood as charging an indictable crime, the words
are actionable per se.24
The second necessary element of the rule is that the indictable
offense charged must involve a high degree of moral turpitude or
subject the party to infamous punishment. The necessity of attach-
ing importance to the nature of the act and the punishment as-
signed to it is that social degradation might result from either one of
them.2s Although a number of courts consider this second element
alone as a sufficient basis for an action of slander,26 the majority
of the courts follow the rule in Brooker v. Coffin and require that
both elements be present before the words are actionable per se.
Thus in Ohio, before sodomy was made a statutory crime,27 to
charge a man with committing such an act was not actionable
without allegation of special damages. 28 The court conceded that
the charged act involved the highest degree of immorality and would
tend to exclude such person from society, but since this act was
not declared by the legislature to be a crime it was not actionable
per se. Likewise words charging crimes of desertion2 9 or burglary
of partnership property by a partner 0 involve high degrees of
moral turpitude but they cannot be the basis of slander per se
because the offenses are not indictable. In order to come within
the provisions of these two elements it is not necessary that the
crime charged be a felony in that an indictable misdemeanor in-
volving moral turpitude will satisfy the rule.3l On the contrary,
words that impute misdemeanors which do not involve moral turpi-
23 Brown v. Meyers, 40 Ohio St 99 (1883); Phillips v. LeJune, 1 Ohio Cir.
Ct (N.S.) 616 (1903); Stone v. Ruthman, 21 Ohio Nisi Prius (N.S.) 562 (1919);
Tedtman v. Hancock, 1 Ohio Cir. Ct. 238 (1885).
24 Schoedler v. Motometer Gauge and Equip. Co., 134 Ohio St. 78, 15
N.E 2d 958 (1938).
2S53 C.J.S. Libel and Slander §53 (1948).
26 Larson v. R. B. Wrigley Co., 183 Mim. 28, 235 N.W. 393 (1931); Kelly
v. Faherty, 16 RP. 234, 14 At. 876 (1888).
27 Sodomy has been declared a crime by Onro REV. CoDm §2905.44 (13043)
and the punishment is imprisonment of not less than one nor more than
twenty years.
2SMelvin v. Weiant, 36 Ohio St. 184 (1880); Davis v. Brown, 27 Ohio
St 32 (1875).29 Hollingsworth v. Shaw, 19 Ohio St. 430 (1869).
3OAifele v. Wright, 17 Ohio St 238 (1867).
31 Gray v. Wood, 7 Ohio Nisi Prius 606 (1900).
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tude arQ not actionable per se because they do not meet the neces-
sary second element of the rule. 2
Even though the general rule as stated is adopted in a juris-
diction, it is still difficult to ascertain whether a given charge is
sufficient to support an action for slander per se because of the
vague definitions given to the words moral turpitude and infamous
punishment. This is illustrated by the rule in Ohio which seems to
state that any base or vile act that does not conform to the generally
accepted rules of society, whether these rules are enforceable as
legal obligations, involves moral turpitude.3 3 Infamous punishment
is generally assumed to mean imprisonment or death although the
courts in the United States are not in full agreement as to what
constitutes imprisonment. In some jurisdictions, imprisonment in
the penitentiary as opposed to common jail is essential for infamous
punishment.3 4 Other jurisdictions hold that a crime punishable by
a common jail sentence when imputed to a person is sufficient
basis for an action of slander per se.85 While the statutes of Ohio
do not define any offense as infamous, felonies may, by analogy,
be so regarded inasmuch as a conviction involves the loss of civil
rights under Omo REV. CODE § 2961.01 (12390).8 Since all
offenses which may be punished by death or imprisonment in the
penitentiary are felonies,3 7 it can be argued in Ohio that infamous
punishment would not include confinement in a common jail.3 In
view of this, Ohio would probably go along with the courts that
require confinement in a penitentiary or death to satisfy the re-
quirement of infamous punishment.
The principles above discussed governing imputations of crime
as slanderous per se will now be considered with reference to sev-
eral specific crimes. As a general statement it can be said that a
3 2 LaIds V. Caylor, 5 Ohio Nisi Prius 216 (1898).
33 Hughey v. Bradrick, 39 Ohio App. 486, 488-9, 177 N.. 911, 912 (1931); In
re Bostwick, 29 Ohio Nisi Prius (N.S.) 21, 29 (1931); Landis v. Caylor, 5 Ohio
Nisi Prius 216, 217 (1898).
3 4 Cline v. Holdrege, 122 Neb. 151, 239 N.W. 639 (1931); IEsTATzmExT,
ToRSs §571 Comment (e) (f) (1938) which states: "The offense must be of
a type which is punishable by death or imprisonment in the state or federal
prison or like istitution... (f) For an offense to be punishable by imprison-
ment 'other than in lieu of a fine' it must be possible for the punishment to
be imposed directly and not collaterally for the failure to pay a fine. If
the court may in its discretion impose either a fine or imprisonment or both,
the offense is punishable by imprisonment."
3SLe Moine v. Spicer, 146 Fla. 758, 1 So. 2d 730 (1941); Priest v. Cen-
tral States Fire Ins. Co., 223 Mo. App. 122, 9 S.W. 2d 543 (1928); Early v.
Winn, 129 Wis. 291, 109 N.W. 633 (1906).
36 Stockunm v. State, 106 Ohio St. 249, 139 N.E. 855 (1922).
37 Omo REV. CODE 1.06 (12372).
38 Stockum v. State, 106 Ohio St. 249, 139 N.E. 855 (1922); Landis v. Cay-
lor, 5 Ohio Nisi Prius 216 (1898).
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false or malicious charge of perjury is actionable per se.u Ordi-
narily, it is necessary that it appear that some proceeding had been
pending at which the person could have been sworn and could
have been punished for perjury if his oath were false, but under
the rules of pleading in Ohio it is unnecessary to allege this.40 Since
an accusation of perjury implies within itself everything necessary
to constitute this offense it is not slander to charge one with swear-
ing falsely, if it appears that the swearing was done before a court
without competent jurisdiction. 41 Likewise the perjury charged
must be on a subject which is important and material to an issue
in the trial.42 A charge of false swearing to be actionable per se
must relate to some swearing, which if false, would constitute a
crime of perjury.43 The reason is that a person may have sworn to
a falsehood but did not know at the time of the statement that it
was false and therefore could not be convicted of the crime of
perjury. These two crimes illustrate the necessity of an indictable
crime being charged, element number one of the rule in Brooker
v. Coffin, before the imputation can be slanderous per se. They
also show that if the first element of the rule is complied with, the
second would be too, because the crimes are ones subjecting the
offender to a possible confinement in a penitentiary.
Oral statements charging arson, as defined by the common law
or by statutes in those states which do not have common law
crimes," are actionable per se. Usually it is not actionable to charge
a person with burning his own property, but in Ohio if the charge
is that the property was burned with the intent to defraud an in-
surance company, the rule is otherwise.45 This is because by statute
the offense is made an indictable crime for which a penitentiary
sentence can be given . 4 6 However in another jurisdiction, such a
charge, although an indictable misdemeanor, was held not to be an
infamous crime and therefore not actionable per se.47 This case
illustrates the fact that both elements of the rule in Brooker v.
Coffin must be present before the imputation can be slanderous
39 Stiekels v. Hall, 3 Ohio Cir. Ct 398 (1888); Omo REv. CODE §291725
(12842) makes the punishment for perjury imprisonment for not less than
one nor more than ten years.
40 Stickel v. Hall, 3 Ohio Cir. Ct 398 (1888); Omo REv. CoDE §294.18
(1437-17).
41 Haemm v. Wickline, 26 Ohio St 81 (1875); Willis v. Patterson, Tappan
original 324, reprint 275 (1819).
42 Wilson v. Oliphant, Wright 153 (1832).
43 Hamm v. Wickline, 20 Ohio St. 81 (1875); Wilson v. Oliphant, Wright 153
(1832); Waggoner v. Richmond, Wright 173 (1932).
44 For example see Omro Rsv. CODE §2907.02 (12433).
4S Hilbrant v. Simmons, 18 Ohio Cir. Ct. 123 (1898).
46 Omo RKv. CODE §2907.03 (12433-1).
47I)avio v. Carey, 8 Pa. Co. 578 (1889).
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per se. To comply with the second element of the rule, it could be
said that even though the misdemeanor did not subject the person
to an infamous punishment it was one involving moral turpitude.
At one time in Ohio, the courts held that words charging a
person with being a blackmailer were not actionable per se be-
cause they did not charge an indictable offense.48 With the passage
of a statute making blackmailing an indictable crime for which a
penitentiary sentence could be imposed the cases have held that
these words are actionable per se.49
To charge a woman with keeping a house of ill fame was at
common law actionable without proof of special damages because
it was an indictable offense. It would seem that keeping such
a place could be construed as imputing a want of chastity and
therefore come under that specific exception. 50 In Ohio this type
of charge could also come under the exception for an oral imputa-
tion of a crime.5 1 But since the punishment under the statute is
a fine of not less than one hundred nor more than three hundred
dollars and imprisonment of not less than ninety days nor more
than six months, or both, this would not at first glance appear to
be sufficient to meet the second element of Brooker v. Coffin. The
second requirement could presumably be met by a finding that
keeping a house of prostitution is an imputation of an indictable
crime involving moral turpitude,5 2 even though there is a dictum in
an early Ohio case stating that an oral charge of keeping a house
of prostitution is not actionable per se.53 Although this is not an
exhaustive list of the crimes in Ohio, it does show how the general
principles are applied by the courts in rendering their decisions.
IMPUTATION OF DISEASE
At common law falsely spoken words to another which impute
a presently existing loathsome or contagious disease are actionable
without proof of special damages. The theory behind this second
exception to the common law rule that slander is not actionable
unless special damages are proved is that if the charge were true
48 Byers v. Forest, 4 Ohio Dec. Repr. 458 (1879).
49English v. English, 9 Ohio Dec. Repr. 167 (1883); OMo REv. CODE
§2901.38 (13384).
so Infra, p. 320.
Sl Oino REv. CODE §2905.14 (13031) makes keeping a house of prostitu-
tion an indictable offense.
s2 Wilkens v. Hammann, 43 Misc. 21, 86 N.Y. Supp. 744 (1904); Posnett v.
Marble, 62 Vt. 481, 20 Atl. 813 (1890).
s3 McDonald v. Durst, Dayton 249 (1868).
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it would exclude the person so charged from society. 4 Although
this theory is applicable to many cases, decisions do not indicate
that such a broad application will be made of the theory.
The specific diseases included within the rule were leprosy
and lues venerea (syphilis), although equally contagious diseases,
such as smallpox, were not included.5 A possible explanation is
that originally leprosy and syphilis were considered as permanent,
lingering and incurable whereas if the victim had smallpox he
either recovered or died shortly after catching it. Occasionally ref-
erence is made to the plague as also being actionable per se, but
there seems to be no reported case on it.56 When the argument was
advanced that gonorrhea should not be added to leprosy and syph-
ilis because it was a different type of disease, the courts very
properly held that this disease would exclude the person from
society and therefore should be actionable per se.57 But when the
courts were confronted with an accusation of a disease like tuber-
culosis they held that it was not actionable without proof of spe-
cial damages even though the person so charged would be some-
what excluded from society. s In jurisdictions that have statutes
defining what constitutes slander per se, the courts can reach a
contrary result for tuberculosis and similar diseases by virtue of
the fact that the statutes are usually broader and can be inter-
preted to permit more actions than would have been possible under
the strict common law classification of caiseases. 59 An oral imputa-
tion of mental disease or insanity likewise does not come within
the tort of slander without showing special damages.6 0 These words
are considered as mere vituperation or abuse. 61
Even though the theory behind this exception is whole or
partial exclusion from society, nevertheless according to the weight
of authority today the disease charged must be a venereal disease.
A particular word or words need not be used in describing the
54 Kaucher v. Blinn, 29 Ohio St. 62 (1875); 9 BAcoN ABR. 45 "Since man
is a being formed for society, and standing in almost constant need of ad-
vice, comfort and assistance of his fellow-servants, it is highly reasonable that
any words which import the charge of a contagious distemper should be in
themselves actionable, because all prudent persons will avoid the company of
one having such distemper."
55 PRossEr, TORTS §92 (1941).
S6Viller v. Monsley, 2 Wils. 403, 95 Eng. Rep. 886 (1769); Joannes v.
Burt, 6 Allen (Mass.) 236 (1863).
57 Watson v. McCarthy, 2 Ga. 57 (1847); Nichols v. Guy, 2 Ind. 82 (1850);
Kaucher v. Blinn, 29 Ohio St. 62 (1875).58Kassowitz v. Sentinel Co., 226 Wis. 468, 277 N.W. 177 (1938).
59Brown v. McCann, 36 Ga. App. 812, 138 S.E. 247 (1927); Kirby v.
Smith, 54 S.D. 608, 224 N.W. 230 (1929).
60Joannes v. Burt, 6 Allen (Mass.) 236 (1863).
61 Goldrick v. Levy, 8 Ohio Dec. Repr. 146 (1881).
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imputed disease and so long as it is understood by the listeners
to refer to a venereal disease the words are actionable per se.62
There would be no social avoidance of a person who has had a
venereal disease and consequently an oral imputation of a past
venereal disease is not actionable per se unless the words impute
a continuance of the disease at the time the words were spoken. 3
Since Ohio has no statute defining what constitutes slander
per se and has an early case holding that an oral imputation of a
venereal disease is actionable without proof of special damages,
Ohio can be considered as following the old strict requirement
that the disease charged must be leprosy, plague, or a venereal
disease. The first two mentioned diseases are no longer of any im-
portance so the rule in Ohio is probably that only oral imputations
of venereal disease are actionable per se.
IMPUTATION OF UNCHASTITY
At English common law an oral imputation of unchastity to
a woman was not actionable without proof of special damages be-
cause an imputation of such an act was only cognizable in the
spiritual courts. 4 For these words to be actionable per se, accord-
ing to the rule of Lord Holt, they must charge an offense for which
an infamous punishment could be inflicted, 5 or as Lord Chief
Justice DeGrey stated, they must impute some specific crime or
misdemeanor.6 Even if the offended female tried to prove special
damages she had a difficult time because of the strict rules relating
to special damages. The hardship of proving special damages was
even greater for a married woman unless she owned her own
business for usually her property was either in her husband's
hands or vested in a trustee for her. The fact that her husband
sustained special damages as a result of the defamatory words
was not enough to give the wife a cause of action. Even the loss
of the society of her friends or the consortium of her husband was
not considered by the court as special damages. 7 The only excep-
6Z Calling a person a syphilitic degenerate or a syphilitic renegade is ac-
tionable per se. Mann v. Bulgin, 34 Idaho 714, 203 Pac. 463 (1921); Words
charging the pox is actionable per se as an imputation of an infectious dis-
ease. Hewit v. Mason, 24 How. Pr. (N.Y.) 366 (1863), Williams v. Holdredge,
22 Barb. (N.Y.) 396 (1854); Imputing that one has the clap is also slander-
ous per se. Kaucher v. Blinn, 29 Ohio St. 62 (1875), Watson v. McCarthy, 2
Ga. 57 (1874), Nichols v. Guy, 2 Ind. 82 (1850), Sally v. Brown, 220 Ky.
576, 295 S.W. 890 (1927).
63 Mann v. Bulgin, 34 Idaho 714, 203 Pac. 463 (1921); Iron v. Field, 9 R.I
216 (1869); Pike v. Van Wormer, 5 How. Pr. (N.Y.) 171 (1850); Lowe v. De
Hoog, 193 S.W. 969 (Mo. App. 1927).
64 Roberts v. Roberts, 5 B. & S. 384, 122 Eng. Rep. 874 (1864).
6STurner v. Ogden, 2 Salk. 696, 91 Eng. Rep. 59D (1787).
66 Onslow v. Home, 3 Wils. 177, 95 Eng. Rep. 999 (1771).
67 Lynch v. Knight, 9 H.L Cas. 577, 11 Eng. Rep. 854 (1861).
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tion to this rule was an action brought in the cities of London,
Bristol and the borough of Southwark for words spoken within
the jurisdiction of these courts.68 Under the custom of these cities,
a prostitute was "carted" and therefore to call a woman such a
name would impute a criminal offense to her and the imputation
would be slanderous per se in the common law courts. The common
law rule denying recovery in almost all cases of imputations of un-
chastity unless special damages were proved was denounced by
the English judges themselves. 69 As a result of this, the old English
rule was changed in 1891 by the SLA=mER OF Wo=N ACT.70 This
act of Parliament provided that words imputing unchastity or adul-
tery to a woman or girl are actionable without proof of special
damages.
In spite of its harshness, the common law rule has been rec-
ognized in the United States and in many instances the courts have
held that words imputing want of chastity are not actionable per
se.71 The common law has however been repudiated in some juris-
dictions, of which Ohio is one, by force of a statute making oral
charges of unchastity actionable per se.7 2 In other jurisdictions, as
a result of judicial decisions, the common law is not followed.7
The rule adopted by the American Law Institute is another ex-
ample showing that the common law is too harsh and should be
changed.7 4
The changes made in the common law of slander up to 1875
by the states is summed up by Justice Clifford of the Supreme
Court of the United States in Pollard v. Lyon. In the same year
68 Theyer v. Eastwick, 4 Burr. 2032, 98 Eng. Rep. 59 (1767); Brand v. Rob-
erts6 4 Burr. 2418, 98 Eng. Rep. 267 (179); Roberts v. Herbert, 1 Sid. 97, 82
Eng. Rep. 993 (1714); Power v. Shaw, 1 Wils. 62, 95 Eng. Rep. 493 (1744).
69 Lord Campbell in Lynch v. Knight, supra, n. 67, said, "I may lament the
unsatisfactory state of our law according to which the imputation of words
however gross, on an occasion however public, upon the chastity of a modest
matron or a pure virgin, is not actionable without proof that it has actually
produced special temporal damage to her."
7054 & 55 Vict., c. 51 (1891).
71 Douglas v. Douglas, 4 Idaho 293, 38 Pac. 934 (1895); Brooker v. Cof-
fin, 5 Johns. (N.Y.) 188 (1809); Neelands v. Dugan, 100 Ore. 177, 196 Pac.
1116 (1921); Barnett v. Phelps, 97 Ore. 242, 191 Pac. 502 (1920).72 Oao REv. CoDE §290L37 (13383); McDaniel v. Jordan, 164 Ark. 455,
262 S.W. 30 (1924); Ivester v. Coe, 33 Ga. App. 620, 127 S.. 790 (1925); Hol-
man v. Plumlee, 206 Ky. 275, 267 S.W. 221 (1924); Kosonen v. Waara, 87 Mont.
24, 285 Pac. 668 (1930); Notarmuzzi v. Shevack, 108 N.Y.S. 2d 172 (1951).
73 Biggerstaff v. Zimmerman, 108 Colo. 194, 114 P. 2d 1096 (1941); Bat-
tles v. Tyson, 77 Neb. 563, 310 N.W. 299 (1906); Barnett v. Ward, 36 Ohio St. 107
(1880) (before statute made it a crime).
74 RPsrxTrszss, ToRTs §§570, 574. "One who falsely and without a priv-
ilege to do so, publishes a slander which imputes to a woman unchastity is
liable to her."
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Justice Wright of Ohio reiterated this same rule, but in a more
crystalized form. Under his statement of the rule for the words
to be actionable per se they must come within one of the following
classes:
I. The words must import a charge of an indictable offense,
involving moral turpitude or infamous punishment,
I1. Impute some offensive or contagious diseases calculated
to deprive the person of society,
III. Tend to injure him in his trade or occupation. 75
This set of rules would not seem to allow a charge of unchastity to
be actionable per se but there has been an encroachment on the
common law rule of slander by the courts of this state and probably
the greatest innovation has been made to benefit women. As early
as 1843 the Supreme Court of Ohio stated that words imputing to
a woman the want of chastity would be actionable without proof of
actual damages.76 A few years later the supreme court took an-
other step and held that calling a young lady an hermaphrodite
was actionable per se.77 This decision was made in forceful lan-
guage and even though the court had full knowledge of the limita-
tions on the common law and the practice in England they stated
they would not allow such a gross wrong to pass without a remedy.
The court thought it would be a disgrace to the law not to allow
a remedy for an oral charge which brings a girl into ridicule and
contempt and excludes her from social intercourse and all hopes
of marriage. By allowing this remedy the court created another
exception to the common law -that words which have a tendency
to wound her feelings, bring her into contempt and prevent her
from occupying her rightful position in society are actionable per
se. Almost twenty years later this exception was apparently recog-
nized in Alfele v. Wright8 and again in 1875. 9 This later case deal-
ing with charging a man with sodomy stated that although repeat-
ed appeals had been made to the supreme court to make further
innovations on the common law rule, they have been without avail
if exception is made for Malone v. Stewart,80 which stands alone.
Again in a later case involving a charge of sodomy to a man, the
court refused to make further innovation and give the plaintiff
a remedy even though the charge was one which reflected the
highest degree of disgrace and infamy.8 ' This charge today would
7 5 Davis v. Brown, 27 Ohio St. 326 (1875).
7 6 Wilson v. Runyon, Wright 651 (1843), overruled on other points in
Bucklin v. State, 20 Ohio 18 (1851) and French v. Millard, 2 Ohio St. 44 (1853).
77 Malone v. Stewart, 15 Ohio 319 (1846).
78 17 Ohio St. 238 (1867).
79 Davis v. Brown, 27 Ohio St. 326 (1875).
8015 Ohio 319 (1846).
8 1Melvin v. Weiant, 36 Ohio St. 184 (1880).
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come under the exception for imputations of crimes because sodomy
has been made an indictable crime for which an infamous punish-
ment can be inflicted.8 2
An imputation that an unmarried woman is pregnant or that
she had a bastard child before she was married is actionable per se
because it amounts to a charge of unchastity.83 It is important that
it be shown that the person so charged was not married at the time
she was pregnant or had the child because unchastity is not im-
puted where it does not appear clearly whether the woman was
unmarried or married.8 4 But of course to charge a married woman
with having a child by a person other than her husband would be
actionable without alleging special damages. Whether these two
instances could come under the exception for oral charges of in-
dictable crimes depends on the statute creating the crimes of forni-
cation and adultery.8, The Ohio statute does not define either
adultery or fornication and the criminal offense is not directed
at single acts of adultery or fornication but rather to cohabitation
in such a state. Hence it would seem that a mere oral charge that an
unmarried woman was pregnant would not impute a crime of forni-
cation, although it would definitely constitute a single act of forni-
cation. A charge that a married woman had a child by a person
other than her husband would likewise constitute a single act of
adultery, but again the single act alone would not meet the re-
quirements of the Ohio statute. Assuming enough other facts to
meet the requirements of the Ohio statute, we still have a problem
similar to the one that arose in the discussion of imputations of
keeping houses of prostitution 6 because the maximum sentence
for fornication and adultery is a fine of not more than two hundred
dollars and imprisonment for not more than three months.
IMPUTATIONS AFFECTING Busimss, EMPLOYMENT,
OCCUPATION, OFFICE OR PROFESSION
The fourth exception recognized in Ohio to the general rule
that slander is not actionable without proof of special damages is a
false imputation which affects the calling of a particular individual.
The early English cases indicate that the terms "trade" and "pro-
fession" were to be limited rather narrowly, 7 but it is well settled
today that false words spoken of a person's business, employment,
occupation, office or profession are actionable per se. This exten-
sion appeared because of the apparent likelihood that temporal
82 See supra, n. 27.
83 Murray v. Murray, 13 Ohio Dec. Rep. 555 (1871).
84Parks v. Berry, 307 Ky. 21, 209 S.W. 2d 726 (1948).
85 OHro REv. CoDE §2905.08 (13024).
86Supra, p. 318.
87 Terry v. Hooper, I Raym. 86 (1663); Fox v. Lapthorne, T. Jones 156
(1681); Barker v. Ringrose, Popham 184 (1626).
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damage would result from such false imputations. The only limita-
tion on the various types of callings is that unlawful or unauthor-
ized activities are not protected from defamatory statements.88 For
words spoken of a person's calling to be actionable per se they must
relate to the person in his specific business, employment, occupa-
tion, office or profession and must be of the kind that are incompat-
ible with proper conduct of that particular calling.s A simple il-
lustration will show when words relate to his profession: Mrs.
Citizen says to her neighbor, of her family physician, that he can-
not hang doors properly and she also states that the carpenter she
had last week cannot correctly remove an appendix. Obviously
the words are not defamatory per se because they do not convey an
injurious imputation to the carpenter or the physician. On the
other hand, if the imputation of lack of ability in the performance
of the medical operations were made of the physician the words
would then relate to his profession and would be actionable with-
out averment of special damages. The same result would follow if
the lack of skill in hanging doors were imputed to the carpenter
because it would directly relate to his trade. It is also to be noted
that disparaging words to be actionable per se must be peculiarly
harmful to a person in that particular calling and cannot be words
that are equally discreditable to all persons.90
Since the basis of this exception is that the person assailed is
disgraced or injured in his calling or is exposed to the hazard of
losing his office, employment or business; therefore, for the words
to be actionable per se they must be spoken while the person is
actually engaged in such calling.9 ' Also, a statement imputing a
mere single act of misjudgment in the conduct of his business, em-
ployment, occupation, office or profession would not be actionable
without proof of special damages unless the single act charged
reasonably implies an habitual want of skill which the public is
entitled to expect of a person in such a calling. These statements
are not actionable without proof of special damages because human
beings are not infallible and consequently mistakes are unavoid-
able.
So much for the general rules and now the imputations will
be illustrated by .reference to the particular business, employment,
occupation, office or profession in which the alleged defamed per-
son is engaged.
8833 Amw. JuR. Libel and Slander §65 (1948); Buanxcis LAw oP Toms §48
(4th Ed. 1926); PsossER, ToRTs §92 (1941).
89 Lohr v. Buffington, 18 Ohio Cir. Ct. (N.S.) 583 (190); Goldrick v.
Levy, 8 Ohio Dec. Repr. 146 (1881).
9OREE-ATEmENT, TORTS §573 (1938).
91 Dyer v. MacDougall, 93 F. Supp. 484 (E.D. N.Y. 19M).
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The general rule as to oral charges against a clergyman that
impute to him a mental or moral unfitness to perform the duties
of that office or accuse him of acts which are irreconcilable with
the discharge of his clerical duties are slanderous per se.9 2 In Ohio
there is very little authority on this point but an early supreme
court decision clearly held that to charge a clergyman with drunk-
enness, when spoken of and concerning him in his office, was ac-
tionable per se.93 The court so held because the oral imputation,
if true, would tend to deprive him of his salary and may prevent
him from obtaining future employment. The reasoning is simple
because if the words are believed, they must necessarily deprive
him of the respect, veneration, and confidence which a minister
of the gospel needs if he is going to be retained by the present con-
gregation or hired by another church group. Following this same
line of reasoning, other charges of unfitness for the position would
also be actionable per se. As was stated in the holding of Hayner
v. Cowden" it is essential that before any damages be recovered
for the spoken words it must be shown that they were spoken of
and concerning the person in his office. Although Bigelow v.
Brumleye is a libel case it illustrates this principle very well. In
that case a clergyman was charged with being a "paid lobbyist for
the Single Tax Movement." The Supreme Court of Ohio held that
these words were not spoken of him concerning his office and
therefore not actionable without proof of special damages.
The Ohio courts have also been willing to grant relief to at-
torneys and therefore in accordance with the general rules laid
down earlier in this section, an action for words spoken of and
concerning an attorney would be actionable per se if they tend
to injure him as a member of his profession.9 8 Thus false oral
statements indicating that an attorney is lacking the necessary
qualifications to practice law are actionable without proof of spe-
cial damages; whereas mere vituperative language or general abuse
of the attorney is not actionable per se unless it has reference
to his conduct in his profession.97 Since much of an attorney's time
is spent on individual cases, the question arises as to whether a
statement imputing a single mistake in the conduct of his profes-
sion is actionable per se. The test for determining whether the
words spoken of and concerning the attorney relating to a particu-
9133 Am. Jum. Libel and Slander §75 (1948); 25 0. Jura Libel and
Slander §32 (1932); 53 AL.R. 637 (1928).
93 Hayner v. Cowden, 27 Ohio St. 292 (1875).
94 hbd.
9S 138 Ohio St. 574, 37 NE. 2d 584 (1941).
96 Godrick v. Levy, 8 Ohio Dec. Repr. 146 (1881).
9 1 Goodeiow v. Tappan, 1 Ohio 61 (1923); Goldrick v. Levy, 8 Ohio Dec.
Repr. 146 (18U).
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lar case are actionable is sometimes said to be that if they ascribe
to the attorney a mere want of information or good management
as is compatible with general skill and care in the profession then
the words are not actionable per se. But if they impute general in-
competency, gross ignorance or gross negligence in the discharge
of professional duties they are actionable per se.9 Although there
is neither a recent Ohio decision nor an Ohio Supreme Court de-
cision on this point, an early lower court case, Goldrick v Levy, 9
seems to apply this same general rule.
Very closely related to the protection given to attorneys for
false imputations relating to their profession is that given to phy-
sicians, surgeons, and dentists. In fact the authority given for deci-
sions involving physicians and surgeons has sometimes been drawn
from cases involving false charges made against attorneys. 00 This
was done without mentioning the fact that these were different pro-
fessions. As the attorney, the physician, the surgeon, and the
dentist deal with individual cases, therefore it must be determined
whether a false oral imputation of a single mistake by one of
these professional persons is actionable per se. It is well known
that doctors, surgeons and dentists can mistake the patient's symp-
toms, misjudge the diseases, and even underestimate the effect
of the medicine. But these errors do not necessarily prejudice him
because they do not impute culpable negligence or unskillfulness
with respect to his profession. Rather, they illustrate that humans
are subject to error. Comparing a charge of negligence or unskill-
fulness to a physician in the management of a single case with a
similar charge to an attorney it would seem that a physician's
single error would be considered as an unavoidable error and a
matter of human fallibility whereas the attorney's error would
more likely be understood as indicating a general incompetence to
practice law. Even so, if the false imputation about the physician's
profession is such that imputes to him a general ignorance or want
of skill in the profession it is actionable without proof of special
damages.' 0' A very early Ohio case held that before words are
actionable per se they must relate to the person's professional skill
and capacity or his professional integrity. 0 2 While the theory is
true, it was not properly applied in that case. The court held that
it was not actionable per se to say that a physician was so "steady"
drunk that he could no longer get any business. According to mod-
98 High v. Supreme Lodge of the World Loyal Order of Moose, 214 MInn.
164, 7 N.W. 2d 675, 144 A.L.R. 810 (1943).
99 Supra, n. 96.
100 See Note, 144 A.L.R. 815 (1943).
101 See Note, 124 A.L.R. 554 (1940).
102 Anonymous, 1 Ohio 83 (1823).
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ern day standards this would be actionable without proof of special
damages because if reflects on the physician's professional quali-
fications and capacity.10 3 This same type of reasoning has been
applied to defamation of teachers'04 and private employees. 0 5
The treatment of false imputations affecting public officers and
candidates for public office has been treated somewhat differently
from that given to professionals and private employes. 106The
broadest immunity that has been impressed on the law of defama-
tion concerning this group of persons is that of fair comment on mat-
ters of public concern. 107 Since a man's private character often in-
dicates characteristics that are not compatible with the discharge
of his public duties it would seem that these characteristics will of-
ten be of public concern. The fact that he put himself before the
public affords a legal excuse for making statements that would
otherwise be actionable. It is also based on the thought that free
public discussion should be encouraged as a means of combating
abuses, or offenses, or misconduct on the part of the men in the pub-
lic field. 108 It is thought that many crucial issues would not be dis-
cussed if the commentator had to fear a slander suit. But an early
Ohio case held that the mere fact that a person has a public office or
is a candidate therefor confers no authority upon the public to utter
falsehoods which amount to slander. 109 The court clearly stated that
if falsehoods were spoken about these persons then the qualified
men would leave public employment and the government would be
run by men who had no regard for their character.
As can be readily seen there are two conflicting interests: (1)
the public official's or the candidate's reputation and (2) the right
to free discussion. Too much favoritism either way will not work. A
workable test would be whether or not the particular attack would
affect the public official's or the candidate's fitness for his specific
position. If it does, then the public has a sufficient interest and is
therefore subject to fair comment.
103 Amick v. Montross, 206 Iowa 51, 220 N.W. 51, 58 A.L.R. 1147 (1928).
i04 Mulcahy v. Deitrich, 39 Ohio App. 65, 176 N.E. 481 (1931).
105 Nairn v. Albrecht Gros. Co., 3 Ohio L. Abs. 292 (1925); see note, 6
A.L!. 2d 1008 (1949).
106 Noel, Defamation of Public Officers and Candidates 49 CoL L. REv.
875 (1949).
107 Westropp v. E. W. Scripps Co., 148 Ohio St. 365, 74 N.E. 2d 340 (1947).
108 Veeder, Freedom of Public Discussion, 23 HAuIv. L. REV. 413 (1910).
109 Seely v. Blair, Wright 358 (1833). See Hallen, Fair Comment, 8 Tnx.
L. RE:V. 41, 81 (1929) where he cites Publishing Co. v. Moloney, 50 Ohio St
71, 89, 33 N.E. 921, 926 (1893). "In our opinion, a person who enters upon
an office, or becomes a candidate for one, no more surrenders to the public
his private character than he does his private property."
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CONCLUSION
The law of slander is based on the idea that special damages
must be proved before oral words can be actionable. Soon after this
principle was laid down the courts realized that the rule was too
strict and therefore attempted to make it tolerable by creating ex-
ceptions to the rule. Although there is no positive reason why the
specific exceptions were singled out, it is probable that the courts
thought that from these charges damages would naturally follow
and consequently made them actionable per se. There was nothing
wrong with this theory when it was first used but as time passed
this broad idea was not carried forward, and thus only the particu-
lar exceptions remained.
Ohio, like many other states in the United States, accepted the
established three exceptions to the common law rule discussed
above and were very reluctant to extend the exceptions to other
situations. This is neatly illustrated by the cases involving charges
of sodomy to a man before sodomy was declared a crime by stat-
ute.110 To be sure a charge of this nature would damage a person's
reputation, but still the Ohio courts would not extend the excep-
tions and make the charge actionable per se. The charge did not
fit neatly into one of their pigeonholes-it did not charge an in-
dictable offense. Had the courts made the gist of the action insult
rather than damage the imputation would have been actionable.
The refusal to include tuberculosis and smallpox within the ex-
ception for contagious diseases also shows the courts' unwillingness
to make more exceptions to rule that damages must be proved for
slander.
Some of the states have noticed the narrowness and have
attempted to create new exceptions by enacting statutes which
define what imputations are actionable per se. This also gives the
courts a chance to interpret the statutes and thereby get away from
the strict common law rule. Although Ohio has not passed a statute
listing all the imputations that are actionable without proof of spe-
cial damages, she has made imputations of unchastity to a woman
a crime."' By so doing, such a charge would be actionable per se
in that it would come under the exception for imputation of a
crime. It is to be noted though that this is really not a great exten-
sion because even before the statute the Ohio courts were holding
that such a charge would be actionable without proof of dam-
ages." 2
There seems to be no large danger in extending the number
110Melvin v. Weiant, 36 Ohio St 184 (1880); Davis v. Brown, 27 Ohio St.
326 (1875).
"I OHIo REv. CoD §2901.37 (13383).
11 Barnett v. Ward, 36 Ohio St. 107 (1880).
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of imputations that should come under the category of slander
per se although it is admitted that by extending the list more rules
will have to be added to an already not too clear set of rules. If
merely extending the list is not the best answer because the whole
problem is not solved, it is suggested that if all slander were made
actionable without proof of damages the problem could be solved
or at least there would be fewer and clearer rules. With a rule
like this a person could protect his reputation and would not have
to be concerned about coming within one of the narrow exceptions
or proving special damages. On the other side of the coin is the
fact that there would be greater chances for litigation, and that
freedom of speech would be curtailed for fear of being sued. But
if such a law would deter persons from making defamatory state-
ments that certainly would be an advancement toward protecting
reputations. As is true in all reforms, the argument is made that
the doors of the courts would be thrown wide open to ligitation.
In many instances these advance predictions do not materialize.
Therefore it is submitted that more good than harm would result
from extending the number of actionable per se imputations whether
it be done by a partial extension or a complete extension to all ac-
tions of slander.
Carl V. Bruggeman
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